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Protection, legitimacy and 
criminal governance
As the state advanced and became more 
sophisticated, it developed a level of 
social control over the population, and 
its legitimacy was recognised by other 
states.2 This legitimacy differentiated the 
state’s use of violence from the use of 
violence by other actors. Consequently, 
the distinction between state protection 
through the use of violence and the 
protection given by other actors was 
based on the state’s legitimacy. While 
this Weberian notion of the state having 
a legitimate monopoly on the use of 
force has taken precedence in modern 
political thought, Tilly argues that this 
line (between legitimate and illegitimate) 
is ‘uncertain’ and ‘elastic’. He adds that 
‘early in the state making process, many 
parties shared the right to use violence, 
its actual employment, or both at once’.3 
Therefore, it is argued that the use of 
violence in transitional states is often 
shared, and Tilly illustrates that this was 
prevalent among early European nations 
(in the process of state-building) in the 
15th and 16th centuries. Fragile states or 
countries engaging in state-building have 
often been in similar situations with the 
state sharing the ‘monopoly on violence’ 
with warlords or criminals.
When one reverses Tilly’s analogy, it is 
possible to infer that organised crime 
can take on ‘state-like’ characteristics 
in specific spheres based on the level 
of legitimacy and social control the 
criminal (or criminal group) may have. 
This legitimacy is established through 
the use of violence and can develop to 
the point of what Andre Standing terms 
‘criminal governance’.4 Standing states 
that organised crime networks can 
adopt political or governance functions 
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Summary
This paper examines protection racketeering in Cape Town, primarily in the central 
business district (CBD) and on the Cape Flats. While significant security initiatives 
have been undertaken in the city’s CBD since 1999, protection racketeering still 
flourishes. This suggests that it is more than a mere reflection of deficiencies in state 
capacity, and that other factors should also be taken into account. This paper explains 
protection racketeering and contextualises its development in Cape Town.
In A SEmInAl pApEr entitled War 
making and state-making as organized 
crime, Charles Tilly characterises the 
state as a form of organised crime.1 
Tilly’s argument is not centred on 
the premise of all politicians being 
murderers or thieves, but rather on 
the fact that the initial basis for the 
formation of the European state, (which 
in turn formed the basis of the modern 
nation-state) was to provide protection 
to its inhabitants in return for taxes. 
Given that the threat to inhabitants 
mainly emanated from the acquisitive 
inclinations of feudal lords needing 
funding for their war-making ventures 
and personal capital accumulation, part 
of the threat to inhabitants came from 
the actions of the state itself. As with 
the quintessential protection racket, the 
initial formation of the state was based 
on capital accumulation.
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in given territories in order to ensure their 
long-term sustainability. This is noticeable 
in several states, including Italy, where 
organised crime groups such as the 
mafia, Camorra and ‘ndrangheta provide 
a number of functions,5 especially 
protection.6
This paper examines contemporary 
protection racketeering in Cape Town, 
primarily in the Cape Town central 
business district (CBD) and on the Cape 
Flats,7 two areas in which protection 
racketeering is evident despite their 
markedly different socio-economic 
profiles. There are similarities between the 
two areas, but there are also differences 
that determine the form protection 
racketeering takes in each of them. 
While protection rackets on the Cape 
Flats can be linked to the failure of the 
state to institute social control, major 
initiatives to provide security have been 
launched in Cape Town’s CBD since 
1999. These include a relatively extensive 
environment surveillance regime of closed 
contextualises the history of the CBD and 
Cape Flats, as well as the development 
of protection rackets. Finally, the paper 
considers why protection racketeering 
has developed in Cape Town and who is 
most vulnerable.
Private security and 
protection
The business of private 
protection
Traditionally considered the domain 
of the state, protection has become 
increasingly associated with non-state 
institutions, which include regulated 
private security companies and various 
forms of ‘informal’ protective structures 
(such as criminal groups, neighbourhood 
watches and vigilante groups). The lines 
between various forms of protection are 
continually being blurred. Internationally, 
this growth in the legal private security 
industry has coincided with the advent 
of economic neoliberalism, particularly 
after the end of the Cold War, and the 
States increasingly allow private companies to take 
on roles associated with the police, and to operate in 
spaces associated with the use of violence
circuit television (CCTV) cameras that are 
centrally controlled and managed by the 
city authorities in collaboration with the 
South African police Service (SApS).8 
However, the state has not been able to 
put an end to protection racketeering, 
which appears to have existed for at least 
two decades in the city centre and even 
longer on the Cape Flats. This suggests 
that protection rackets do not necessarily 
only reflect deficiencies in state capacity 
and policing, and that there are a number 
of other factors that must be taken 
into account. Furthermore, it is evident 
that state authority is often shared with 
‘informal authority’, which includes civil 
society and can include organised crime.9
The paper defines and explains 
protection racketeering, after which it 
growing recognition of private actors and 
companies that provide protection10 for 
and within the state. States increasingly 
allow private companies to take on roles 
traditionally associated with the police 
and military, and to operate in spaces 
requiring or associated with the use of 
violence. This is noticeable through the 
subcontracting and growth of the private 
military industry and private military 
companies (pmCs).11
private security has become an integral 
part of security across the globe. 
private policing now forms part of 
the South African security apparatus, 
and its exponential growth is well 
documented.12 private security ranges 
from conventional security guards to 
highly trained and skilled professionals 
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with a military or policing background. 
According to the private Security Industry 
regulatory Authority’s (pSIrA) annual 
report (2011/2012), there are 427 174 
registered ‘active’ security officers in 
the country.13 The majority of security 
officers are on ‘guard’ or ‘patrol’ duty and 
have limited skills. The current estimated 
annual value of the industry is in excess 
of r50 billion shared among 9 364 
security service providers. So embedded 
has private policing become in South 
Africa that in the three years leading 
up to 2012, the SApS paid up to r350 
million to private companies to guard 
its stations.14
Within South Africa, many private security 
companies have been legitimised by the 
state and are regulated by the pSIrA in 
terms of legislation (the private Security 
Industry regulatory Act 56 of 2001 and 
the Security officers Act of 1987). private 
security is seen as a viable and important 
part of the South African security 
apparatus by both the state and the 
public. Although impossible to measure, 
the impact of private security in South 
Africa appears to be positive. According 
to the Institute of race relations, ‘every 
patrol car of a private security firm doing 
crime prevention duties has a deterrent 
effect on crime, allowing the SApS to 
concentrate its resources elsewhere. 
Every response to an alarm by a private 
security company allows the police to 
deal with some other pressing matter.’15 
However, the private security industry has 
also come under increased scrutiny, with 
the government proposing amendments 
to the legislation to limit foreign 
ownership of security companies and 
to increase the regulation of companies 
operating in the country.16 This is taking 
place in the context of the state’s seeking 
to reassert its authority and regulate 
an industry with the potentiality to exist 
alongside state authority. Furthermore, 
unlike ordinary citizens, the nature of 
these companies as ‘violence managing 
agencies’17 makes them far more 
dangerous to civilians as well as the 
state, while their employment or use of 
‘violent entrepreneurs’ (discussed below) 
makes the slip into organised crime 
easier. In Cape Town, some of the largest 
registered security companies were 
operated and influenced by notorious 
underworld figures.18
Protection rackets
Alongside the legal companies providing 
private security, there are many types 
of ‘informal’ protection and security 
in the united States (uS).21 However, 
recent research in Southern Africa 
suggests that many organised criminals 
create a network that is more flexible, 
amorphous and fluid.22
protection racketeering consists of 
planned and ongoing participation in 
a number of defined serious criminal 
offences by a group, which include 
extortion. rICo, which set the precedent 
for tackling criminal enterprises and 
brought racketeering cases into the 
criminal justice system, sought to tackle 
In Cape Town, some of the largest registered security 
companies were operated and influenced by notorious 
underworld figures
occurring across South Africa. The 
focus here is on enterprises that provide 
‘protection’ by using extortive protection 
rackets. These companies may be 
registered as legal enterprises, may be 
criminal enterprises, or may straddle the 
line between legal and illegal enterprise.
Extortion as a crime is defined by 
common law as ‘taking from another 
some patrimonial or non-patrimonial 
advantage by intentionally and unlawfully 
subjecting that person to pressure which 
induces him or her to submit to the 
taking’.19
Extortion can be committed by an 
individual or a number of individuals. 
For example, a single kidnapper can 
extort money from a victim. However, in 
the context of a protection racket, the 
extortion often takes place over a period 
of time and is predominately undertaken 
by a criminal group, prompting 
Skaperdas to state that extortion 
is the defining activity of organised 
crime.20 This should be understood in 
the context of the debatable, narrow 
definitions of organised crime based on 
the hierarchal ‘mafia-model’ typology 
that informed the racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt organizations Act (rICo) 
criminal enterprises and has heavily 
influenced legislation across the world 
– including South Africa’s prevention of 
organised Crime Act (poCA). rather 
than investigating distinct criminal events, 
racketeering investigations focus on 
prosecuting the criminal enterprise. The 
term ‘criminal enterprise’ can refer to 
a wide variety of criminal associations, 
including commercial ‘white collar’ crime. 
racketeering investigations focus on 
‘patterns of criminal activity’ as well as 
predicate offences, and have a more 
specific focus on the enterprise. The 
criminal enterprise itself need not be 
a hierarchal, businesslike structure; 
usually it is a network within which a few 
individuals ultimately reap most of the 
profits from extortion activities.
Extortion activities that are continuous 
and organised amount to protection 
racketeering. The protection racket differs 
from ‘private protection’ or ‘security’ 
as it involves an element of continuing 
criminality. Volkov describes it as:
An institutionalized practice whereby 
tribute is collected on behalf of a 
criminal group that, in exchange, 
claims to offer physical protection from 
other such groups.23
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What is noticeable about Volkov’s 
description of protection rackets is 
that it focuses on the institutionalised 
and ongoing nature of the extortion. 
Furthermore, Volkov argues that the 
protection often takes on an economic 
dimension and the service of protection 
or abstention from violence may begin to 
resemble a contract.
protection rackets have been extensively 
researched in Italy.24 Standing uses 
descriptions of the Sicilian mafia as an 
‘ideal type’ of protection racketeering 
whereby the Sicilian mafia takes 
over state functions and produces 
a hypothetical ideal type of criminal 
governance.25 The Sicilian mafia, for 
example, has a history of protection 
racketeering in areas where the state 
had limited control, particularly rural 
areas. The mafia filled in for the state by 
providing a type of social control and 
dispute resolution that was lacking. The 
fee paid by businesses to local organised 
crime groups to provide protection 
from threats of burglary and robbery 
is known as the pizzo or ‘wet beak’. A 
2012 report by Italian business leaders 
stated that organised crime was the 
country’s biggest business, making €100 
billion a year (up to seven per cent of 
the country’s gross domestic product 
[GDp]) from various activities, including 
protection racketeering.26
Similarly, within post-Cold War russia, 
the transitioning state coupled with 
‘shock therapy’ economic reforms 
created an untenable level of insecurity 
for businesses. It can be argued that 
organised criminal groups became a 
source of parallel authority of protection, 
regulation and control for many 
businesses due to the lack of state 
security and high levels of informal and/
or untaxed income. protection payments 
became known as krysha (russian 
for ‘roof’). In the 2012 case between 
oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and roman 
Abrahmovich, krysha was a concept that 
repeatedly came up. In the judgement 
it was stated that ‘in a society which is 
not governed by the rule of law, people 
devise alternative structures to govern 
their relations’.27 The judgement further 
explained krysha as:
An alternative system of obligation; 
the classic product of a society 
where businessmen cannot count 
on the protection of the law, either 
because the law is itself defective 
or because the administrative and 
judicial agencies charged with its 
enforcement cannot be relied upon 
to do so. Where there is no effective 
law, or no effective legal process 
of enforcement, relationships are 
governed instead by power. It was 
common ground among the experts 
that the situation in russia in the 
1990s and early 2000s was that, 
although there were laws, the legal 
processes were defective.28
However, it should be noted that this 
kind of krysha payment evolved as the 
state progressed and began asserting 
itself more effectively. Krysha then started 
being paid to bureaucrats and politicians 
to protect businesses from ‘enemies and 
competitors’ and to network with those 
in power. The protection that was now 
given was not only to protect businesses 
from physical threats but also from 
business or state threats and to promote 
businesses’ interests.
The joint research Centre on 
Transnational Crime published an 
extensive study on the activities of 
organised criminals in European countries 
with a specific focus on extortion and 
protection rackets. It found that extortion 
racketeering could develop from the 
protection of businesses against losses, 
but also that extortionists themselves 
may create the conditions under which 
protection is needed.29 The study30, 
drawing on monzini31, differentiates 
among the protection rackets according 
to their features, namely:
A 2012 rEporT By ITAlIAn BuSInESS 
lEADErS STATED THAT orGAnISED 




5ISS PAPER 259  •  AUGUST 2014
•	 Extortion-protection: taxation on a 
regular basis imposed by violent means
•	 Labour racketeering: violent negotiation 
for access to the labour market and 
employment
•	Monopolistic racketeering: a specific 
market strategy enforced by violent 
means and aimed at the physical 
elimination of the competitor or the 
creation of monopolistic coalitions
This kind of enforcement and extortion 
need not be limited to ‘traditional’ 
criminals. recent strikes that led to 
mass violence in South Africa’s mining 
industry highlighted how civil society could 
involve itself in labour and monopolistic 
racketeering. The Association of minerals 
and Construction union (AmCu) and the 
national union of mineworkers (num) 
were accused of using violence, threats 
and intimidation against fellow workers 
as well as companies in order to secure 
higher wages and increased membership.
The joint research Centre on 
Transnational Crime also states that 
traditional criminal protection rackets 
have two identifiable types of extortion 
racketeering. These types are systemic 
and casual, which are in turn linked to 
three main variables:
•	 The organisational structure of the 
crime group
•	 Its strong presence at local territorial 
level
•	 The victim-offender relationship32
To explain these three variables, the 
study states that when organised criminal 
groups focus their activities on local 
territories, they will often take on more 
monopolistic and hierarchal structures 
while engaging more frequently with 
state officials. The criminal group will also 
begin infiltrating legitimate businesses. 
The extortion and criminalisation 
becomes systemic as the extortionists 
develop a more symbiotic relationship 
with the local community.33 In Volkov’s 
view, the use of pure terror (in particular, 
the use of violence)34 can only last a 
certain amount of time before there is a 
protest by those affected. Furthermore, 
it may be in the criminal’s interest to 
seek a level of respect and support for a 
more sustainable relationship. Therefore, 
according to Standing, ‘extortion may 
steadily shift toward a more tolerated 
form of protection where those paying 
feel they are given a genuine service, at 
least one preferable to that on offer from 
the state’.35 This can eventually lead to 
a form of criminal governance that has a 
level of legitimacy and means to enforce 
its control over clients.
Despite the pretence of a consensual 
contractual relationship, what 
Town CBD was on the decline and 
suffered severe deterioration after the 
end of apartheid. Increased migration 
into the urban centre following the 
loosening of apartheid restrictions 
coupled with the challenges of 
transition, primarily relating to a lack of 
capacity on the part of both the state 
and the city, led to high levels of ‘grime 
and crime’ and urban decay. This began 
taking its toll as businesses moved 
out and the city battled to remove 
occupants deemed ‘less desirable’ 
(such as the homeless and street 
children).39 As the cityscape changed, 
and urbanisation and migration took 
place, these areas were left with an 
uneasy mix of residents and businesses 
at both ends of the spectrum.
The extortion and criminalisation becomes systemic as 
the extortionists develop a more symbiotic relationship 
with the local community
distinguishes a protection racket is the 
fact that the nature of the contract is 
‘fundamentally asymmetrical’.36 The 
‘wielders of force usually have an array 
of means to remind their clients of the 
asymmetry’37 and therefore ‘violent 
entrepreneurs’ are distinguished from 
ordinary businessmen (even if these 
businessmen are engaged in illicit 
practices) through their particular focus 
on violence. As violent entrepreneurs 
develop they provide ‘necessary 
protection and market conditions needed 
for market relations’, as well as becoming 
‘both enforcers and owners of capital’, 
collectively a ‘warrior community’ focusing 
on the subordination of others.38
Protection racketeering in 
post-apartheid Cape Town’s 
CBD and surrounds
A city in decline:  
Cape Town after apartheid
In a situation similar to that in many 
major cities in South Africa, the Cape 
However, the CBD remained important 
to the city, particularly as it housed 
parliament, numerous businesses, 
high-value real estate and tourist 
attractions. It was also an important 
part of the city’s nightlife. long Street 
and its surrounds within the CBD 
form the main entertainment area of 
the city, which was an apartheid ‘grey 
area’ where there was a certain level of 
mixing between races. It thus acquired 
a bohemian reputation, which it retained 
after the end of apartheid.40 It remains 
a popular night-time venue for many 
people, including students, tourists and 
businesspeople, and hosts a variety of 
restaurants, bars and nightclubs. Alcohol 
consumption also remains important to 
the entertainment establishments.
of particular concern following the end 
of apartheid were the growing levels of 
criminality in the city centre. not all the 
crime at the time was organised, and 
much could be explained by poverty 
within the greater city. 
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Street crime, including that committed 
by children, made the CBD a particularly 
unsafe place.41 Criminality was centred 
around notorious ‘problem buildings’ 
such as Senator park in the CBD. These 
problem buildings also saw high levels of 
property and violent crime, rivalling that 
in certain outlying areas with a far worse 
reputation.
The apparent lack of state capacity to 
deal with criminal elements made it easier 
for security companies and individuals 
such as Cyril Beeka42 to make their mark 
on the city’s informal security set-up.
The 1990s therefore saw a number 
of turf wars between rival protection 
‘moroccans’. Should establishments 
refuse ‘protection’ (a mixture of labour 
and extortion racketeering) from the 
‘white’ security company, the ‘white’ 
security company would send the 
‘moroccans’ to harass the business. 
Thereafter the same security company 
would again offer protection and more 
often than not gain the contract. The 
security company would benefit from 
the protection fees and/or would pay the 
‘moroccans’ a fee for the harassment.45
The protection rackets also provided 
opportunities for former apartheid security 
operatives to make a living.46 Former 
security police officers, who had allegedly 
ring rose to prominence in Cape Town, 
allegedly led by businessman mark lifman, 
Andre naude, alleged Belhar gang ‘Sexy 
Boys’ leader jerome Booysen and a 
number of former Beeka associates. The 
group consisted of a variety of protection 
and security formations that amalgamated 
to form Specialised protection Services 
(SpS). At the beginning of 2012, SpS went 
about trying to acquire protection contracts 
at 200 venues, providing 400 bouncers.48 
A number of business owners complained 
to the police, the media and governmental 
officials over SpS’s use of threats and 
intimidation. The company was shut down, 
as it was not registered with pSIrA. lifman 
and naude now face over 300 charges 
resulting from their involvement.49 Despite 
the arrest of these high-profile figures and 
the closing of SpS, protection racketeering 
still thrives in the CBD.
The upswing In the CBD
By the early 2000s, South Africa was 
arguably stable and had avoided the 
potential mass violence that could have 
followed the transition to a democratic 
state.50 reforms and changes in public 
spending, with an increase in social 
development spending and a strict fiscal 
policy, had placed the government in a 
healthier financial position and allowed 
it to manage the high levels of debt 
accrued by the apartheid government.
Crime permeated the country and South 
Africa recorded high levels of crime over 
the next few years (reaching a peak in 
2002). At the same time a number of 
reforms began taking place, which had 
a significant effect in reducing the levels 
of crime. These reforms were focused 
on both policing and social spending. 
However, in Cape Town, according to 
Samara,51 criminal victimisation remained 
high in marginalised non-white areas 
while more affluent areas (including the 
CBD) managed to reduce the levels of 
crime within their ‘borders’. This can be 
attributed to apartheid town planning, 
which provided far more police resources 
Former security police officers, who had allegedly 
established links during the apartheid years with the 
‘Americans’ gang, now ran security companies. 
merchants as they sought control over 
the lucrative protection and drug markets 
of the city. The city could not constrain 
them or provide the service that had 
made the presence of these groups 
acceptable in the first place. According 
to kinnes, during this period ‘violence 
was also displaced as the realisation 
grew that more profit was to be made 
from transactions within the city limits’.43 
Therefore, there were clashes in the CBD 
between local gangs and groups such as 
the ‘moroccans’,44 who were operating 
a parking and protection extortion 
scheme for nightclubs. This monopolistic 
racketeering and violence lasted for a 
few years, but eventually the violence 
was settled after a series of high-profile 
confrontations and the settlement and 
division of protection rackets in the city.
kinnes elaborates on how criminal 
networks expanded beyond racial 
and ethnic identities in protection 
racketeering. For example, within the 
CBD there was a noticeable mutually 
beneficial relationship between a local 
‘white’ security company and the 
established links during the apartheid 
years with the ‘Americans’ gang, now 
ran security companies. protection 
racketeering in Cape Town became so 
notorious that it attracted the attention of 
a presidential task team. The presidential 
task team linked these rackets with gangs 
on the Cape Flats and even the Italian 
mafia in the form of Vito pallazzalo.47 
However, the task team was disbanded 
following allegations of corruption.
Further solidifying the business venture 
was the protection needed by the ‘vice’ 
industries that couldn’t approach legitimate 
sources of authority. often escort agencies 
were beholden to protection racketeers 
due to their inability to turn to legitimate 
forms of authority, as their income base 
was illegal. Within this environment 
protection racketeering was integral to the 
protection of the criminal enterprises with 
which it became entangled.
This status quo was maintained for nearly 
two decades as portions of Cape Town 
were ‘divided’ among security providers. 
However, following Beeka’s assassination 
in 2011, another protection and extortion 
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in white areas; increases in state capacity; 
focused civil society and municipal efforts; 
and an increase in private security.
The Cape Town CBD is one of the more 
remarkable stories of urban renewal. 
policy makers, politicians and civil 
society collaborated in creating a safer 
and more marketable district. The Cape 
Town partnership and the Central City 
Improvement District (CCID) led a number 
of reforms within the city. The ‘broken 
windows’52 approach was adopted across 
the city and a harsh approach was taken 
toward those who were blamed for ‘grime 
and crime’. public vagrancy was not 
allowed and street children were removed 
from the city centre. CCTV cameras were 
installed in the city centre and a number 
of civilian and municipal policing patrols 
were established in 2001. The CCID also 
established associations such as the Club 
and Bar Association (2002) to create a 
self-regulating authority to suppress drug 
peddling, turf wars, protection rackets and 
‘sub-standard’ drinking establishments. 
Additionally, the city has taken a number 
of proactive steps in limiting crime and 
vice industries by working with municipal 
policing and establishing specialised 
squads. These squads fall under the 
city directorate and are independent of 
the SApS, while frequently collaborating 
with it. They include vice, drug and gang 
squads, as well as a ‘problem building’ 
squad, which has been successful in 
the implementation of bylaws regarding 
‘problem buildings’. The accomplishments 
of these squads and the CCID initiatives 
are evident, with a number of notable 
success stories. of particular importance 
to the CBD has been the ‘problem 
building’ squad, which in 2012 closed and 
forced the renovation of the Senator park 
building after it had become a location of 
criminal activity.53
Within four months of the CCID’s 
implementation, the CBD recorded a drop 
of 46 per cent in crime. The reductions 
have continued over the last decade and 
violent crime in the city decreased by 
90 per cent from 2005 to 2010. While 
drug-related arrests increased to 955 
(2010) from 180 (2005), this can also 
be interpreted as more effective policing 
rather than just an increase in drug 
dealing. The Cape Town CBD is now one 
of the safest city centres in the country.54
Despite the CBD’s improvement, given 
the type of activities hosted (especially 
in terms of bars and clubs) long Street 
still has a noticeable seedy underbelly, 
with numerous drug dealers, prostitutes, 
brothels and exotic dancers. other 
streets off long Street within the CBD 
limits also host bars, clubs and brothels.
The growth of SpS, described in the 
previous section, is an example of 
the entrenchment and continuance of 
protection rackets despite the city’s 
improvement. protection rackets have 
managed to maintain their particular 
place in the security establishment. 
managers and owners in these areas are 
often unwilling to talk, presumably due to 
fear. Furthermore, given the continuing 
street criminality, there is still a belief that 
these kinds of protection services are 
necessary to maintain a level of order.
A history of the criminal 
economy on the Cape Flats
unlike the CBD, which has been the 
focus of economic activity, the Cape 
Flats area has been described as 
apartheid’s ‘dumping ground’, with the 
majority of residents living there due to 
the forced removal policies of apartheid 
South Africa. It encompasses vast tracts 
of land around the city (132 km²) and 
houses large, predominately coloured 
and black townships with a sizable 
population (rough estimates put the 
figure at over 850 000), although the 
actual number is difficult to determine. 
This paper concentrates on certain 
parts of the Cape Flats with a high 
gang presence and a predominately 
coloured demographic.55 often those 
WITHIn Four monTHS oF THE 
CCID’S ImplEmEnTATIon, THE CBD 
rECorDED A Drop In CrImE oF 
46%
THE rEDuCTIonS HAVE ConTInuED 
oVEr THE lAST DECADE AnD 
VIolEnT CrImE In THE CITy 
DECrEASED By 
90%
 From 2005 To 2010. DruG-rElATED 
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areas with the largest gang presence 
have the highest levels of poverty and 
unemployment. For example, in Hanover 
park, where the majority of residents 
(90 per cent) live in formal dwellings, 
63 per cent of households earn incomes 
of less than r3 200 a month. Similar 
socio-economic profiles predominate in 
neighbourhoods such as lavender Hill, 
Bonteheuwel, Delft and manenberg.56
The Cape Flats, as a residential area, 
was developed in the 1950s, when the 
predominantly coloured population living 
in or near the city centre was forcibly 
removed to the urban periphery. Cape 
Town and the Cape Flats had purposely 
been designed to limit cross racial 
mixing, which in turn made it difficult for 
those living on the urban periphery to 
access employment in the predominately 
white business centres. These areas in 
the Cape Flats also had limited social and 
recreational facilities, as the apartheid 
government concentrated its resources 
on the white areas. parts of the Cape 
Flats soon became dysfunctional areas 
with high levels of unemployment, 
substance abuse problems, poor 
educational and medical facilities, and 
broken family units.57
While areas such as District Six did have 
a level of gang presence,58 the removal 
of people to the Cape Flats and the 
subsequent lack of state services and 
employment opportunities created a 
burgeoning gang problem in these areas 
by the early 1970s. This gang problem 
was exacerbated by a more prohibitive 
stance towards liquor, based on the 
apartheid construct of the coloured 
male being dangerous and lazy.59 
These prohibitions saw the rise of illegal 
shebeens and associated criminality, as 
those in the business sought protection 
from gangs or gangs gained income 
from these shebeens. The problem was 
exacerbated by the ban on mandrax 
and the subsequent boom in the illegal 
market. The large supply of and demand 
for the drug saw criminal gangs grow 
in size and income and become part 
of the political economy of the area. 
Gangs established themselves to provide 
protection to shebeens and drug dealers, 
and to provide drug dealers and shebeen 
owners with protection from the police.60
The Cape Flats after apartheid
While much of the rest of Cape Town has 
been on an upward swing, controlling 
levels of crime and growing economically, 
parts of the city remain untouched by 
the general improvement and are devoid 
of employment opportunities, thereby 
becoming increasingly marginalised. Smith 
and Turok,61 in their study of the economy 
of Cape Town, show that the city centre 
has maintained economic dominance and 
that Cape Town remains monocentric. 
Figure 1:  Office floor space –  the total extent of internal building space used as an office. This can be used as an indicator of economic activity and 
agglomeration in the services sector.
Source: http://ctcs.capetown.gov.za/ecamp62
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recent growth is more dispersed than 
before, but high-income suburban nodes 
have benefitted, not the Cape Flats where 
the poor live. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
The lack of control over certain parts of 
the Cape Flats has been of particular 
concern to successive provincial and city 
leaders, highlighted by the occasional 
deployment of the army to quell gang 
violence. Various studies have shown that 
the state does not have the necessary 
social control on the Cape Flats, and that 
some of these urban spaces are under 
the control of gangs. Despite attempts 
by the state to enforce a level of social 
control on the Cape Flats, robins63 
argues that it has been unable to do so. 
He summarises his views by stating,
Spatial governance in places like 
manenberg will continue to be 
relatively ineffectual given existing 
levels of social inequality and racial 
polarization. Such processes are 
reproduced by massive unemployment 
and racialised poverty resulting from 
socio-spatial legacies of apartheid 
and Cape Town’s shift from a 
manufacturing to a tourist, IT and 
financial services economy.64
robins further argues that:
Contestation between the state 
and gangs over control of space 
in manenberg is part of a broader 
process in terms of which current 
investment strategies and urban 
development schemes have avoided 
poor areas of the Cape Flats, 
thereby reproducing the socio-spatial 
inequalities of the apartheid city.65
While the state has tried to remedy this 
with interventions and renewed social 
planning, in general business is still 
located in the city centre and former 
white areas. The exclusion of certain 
populations is also evident beyond these 
forms of employment and investment, as 
demonstrated by the continuing legacy of 
illegal shebeens.
Protection rackets
In many parts of the Cape Flats gangs 
have taken on a peculiar role, vying with 
the state and civil society as a form of 
social control. The state is no longer the 
primary actor in local power dynamics 
– instead, the state, civil society and 
organised crime groups often function 
in mutually supportive relationships that 
are ‘continually being established and 
reshaped’.66 lambrechts argues that 
none of these actors has a monopoly of 
power and that the actors and positions 
change constantly.
The conceptualisation and understanding 
of protection rackets in the Cape Flats 
Standing’s study found that few formal 
businesses were victims of extortion. 
Three of the four formal businesses that 
faced extortion demands (out of 75 
formal businesses) refused to pay, while 
one paid r250. Standing broadened his 
questioning by asking formal businesses 
if they paid for security from third-party 
firms and whether they had a choice in 
choosing the firm. In his findings, out of 
the 75 businesses surveyed, 33 paid 
security firms. out of these, only five were 
not happy with the service and 11 were 
unable to find adequate replacement 
security companies in the area. Among 
informal traders, 14 out of 53 traders 
reported being extorted by criminal 
The state is no longer the primary actor in local 
power dynamics – instead, the state, civil society and 
organised crime groups often function in mutually 
supportive relationships
varies. Standing’s67 study on the criminal 
economy of the Cape Flats focuses on 
the levels of extortion faced by both 
formal and informal traders as well as 
illegal shebeen owners. In his research 
he found that shebeen owners often 
complained of having to pay extortion 
money to the police. This is similar to 
the findings on police corruption by 
liza Grobler, who found that the police 
officers would often go to a shebeen with 
a new police recruit to see whether the 
recruit accepted free alcohol. Should the 
recruit take the drink, this would confirm 
that he was ‘one of them’ and he would 
be included in corrupt activities.68 If not, 
the police officers, acting in concert, 
would try to remove him from their 
precinct or shift. Shebeen owners saw 
criminal gangs and drug operators as 
being less of a problem than the police 
in demanding protection payments. 
However, Standing adds that shebeen 
owners are often involved in the drug 
trade and thus their relationships with 
criminal gangs are complex.
gangs, but from Standing’s research it 
seemed as though the protection racket 
was more sporadic than formal. Standing 
states that informal traders who did 
admit to paying extortion did not provide 
amounts, which may well be because 
they did not trust the interview process. 
However, he adds that only two informal 
traders said extortion occurred more 
than once, which suggests opportunistic 
rackets. Summarising his findings, 
Standing states,
primary research on the phenomenon 
of protection rackets on the Cape Flats 
has produced inconsistent findings. 
There are many people who claim 
that protection rackets are common 
throughout the region, particularly 
involving the shebeen industry. 
However, in two areas studied for 
this research, mitchells plain and 
Atlantis, there is very little evidence 
of well-organised protection rackets, 
although there are high crime rates 
and insecurity alongside ubiquitous 
criminal groups and street gangs. 
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Where extortion is recorded, our 
data suggests this is opportunistic, 
predatory and sporadic.69
Differing results are evident in research 
conducted by lambrechts70 in 
manenberg. She found that businesses 
had to pay gangs in order to operate 
in their areas. If payment was not 
forthcoming, intimidation and threats 
would follow and the gangs would 
rob the businesses. She quotes a 
rehabilitated Hard livings gang member, 
who says,
See, sometimes the Hls (Hard livings 
Gang) can come in and rob you … 
They can take the stuff anytime if they 
want to, but if you want protection 
you’ve got to pay us for the protection 
so that you don’t get robbed and if 
you don’t want to die, you also have to 
pay for protection.71
from some Chinese entrepreneurs 
to ensure their shipping container 
businesses remain on public property.
one of Charman and piper’s most 
interesting findings is that there is an 
important relationship in Delft between 
landlords and shopkeepers. While half of 
the respondents stated they had nobody 
to turn to for support when facing 
crime and violence, of those who could 
rely on others, coloured shopkeepers 
turned to their neighbours or community 
policing forums and black shopkeepers 
turned to street committee leaders, 
whereas foreigners sought the landlord’s 
protection. Thus the powerful landlord 
can become an important safety net. 
In the study they refer to a shopkeeper 
who rented from a well-known drug lord 
and paid more than double the rent, 
but got protection in return. Similarly, 
the underlying causes of violence in the 
taxi industry in the Western Cape, it was 
found that taxi associations were involved 
in illegal activities, including murder, and 
the report stated that ‘taxi association 
mother bodies operate like a modern day 
mafia with the power to extort monies 
from operators, the ability to kill people 
who disagree with them and threaten 
their interests’.75 The report further stated 
that a group of 30 or 40 people were 
behind much of the violence and that 
there was a link with gangs, especially 
in coloured associations. The gangs 
extort money from operators and drivers. 
Furthermore, the report found that there 
was a link with organised criminals who 
used the taxis to carry and distribute 
drugs, and to transport prostitutes 
on occasion.
Thus protection racketeering takes 
on multiple forms on the Cape Flats. 
The protection of businesses and 
inhabitants is often far more complex 
than just straightforward coercion. The 
lack of state capacity and authority, as 
well as the importance of the criminal 
economy in the area, has created various 
arrangements of power that include 
criminals. Furthermore, the rampant 
corruption in the police force and ‘hard 
policing’ strategies have made it more 
difficult to turn to legitimate sources of 
authority. jensen relates how police 
officers referred to entire Cape Flats 
communities as ‘cockroaches’76 and 
Samara states ‘policing in the townships 
is in effect reinforcing the wedge that 
exists between police and residents, 
deepening mistrust and cynicism and 
eroding the ground in which genuine 
long term crime prevention, and therefore 
social development, could potentially 
take root’.77
Analysis of protection rackets in 
the CBD and the Cape Flats
The various types of protection rackets 
in Cape Town highlight the multiple 
formations these rackets may take. 
The rampant corruption in the police force and ‘hard 
policing’ strategies have made it more difficult to turn 
to legitimate sources of authority
In a study by Charman and piper,72 
particular attention is paid to immigrant, 
primarily Somali, businesses in the 
township of Delft on the Cape Flats. 
unlike many other suburbs on the Cape 
Flats, Delft is more racially mixed, with 
a fairly large black population (40 per 
cent) in a majority coloured (60 per cent) 
township. particular types of protection 
and extortion exist in Delft. In the wake 
of xenophobic violence, curfews have 
been set for businesses. However, 
shopkeepers tend to violate the curfew 
despite the risks and state that they 
have more trouble from the police than 
the community. yet street gangs and 
criminals target these foreign-run spaza 
shops for protection payments. Should 
the shopkeepers fail to pay, they throw 
bricks and stones at the container that 
houses the spaza shop. Charman and 
piper give the example of the Delft 
Development Forum extracting payments 
other shopkeepers rented from well-
known community leaders as a source 
of protection.
While businesses, both formal and 
informal, may suffer from protection 
racketeering, the taxi industry has been 
under considerable strain from gangs. 
protection rackets in this industry were 
established in the 1980s in the wake of 
the government’s massive deregulation 
of the public transport sector.73 In the 
vacuum left by state authority, violent 
conflicts (known as taxi wars) over routes 
and fares occurred.
The taxi industry now consists of 
thousands of operators, and the 
established associations that represent 
taxi drivers can be seen as racketeers 
who demand payment. However, they 
do provide a level of protection in an 
extremely dangerous and cut-throat 
business. In the ntsebeza report74 on 
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protection rackets in the CBD and on 
the Cape Flats vary to a large extent 
in both sophistication and type. Thus 
protection rackets in the CBD and Cape 
Flats have a number of both noticeable 
characteristics and reasons for their 
continued existence.
In the CBD
What is noticeable in the Cape Town 
CBD is that those providing security often 
blur the line between private security and 
criminal groups. Before being shut down, 
SpS operated like a legitimate security 
body, going as far as trying to legitimise 
its activities with the pSIrA by aligning 
itself with a legitimate company.78 The 
complications within the CBD regarding 
private protection highlight the failure to 
regulate the private security industry. The 
pSIrA as a regulatory body is out of its 
depth, undermanned and understaffed. 
Currently, there is only one pSIrA 
inspector to 9 000 security officers.79 
many of the protection rackets in the 
CBD have ties to legitimate companies. 
Beeka’s companies were registered 
with the pSIrA and therefore these 
companies have a level of legitimacy.
The action of protection rackets in the 
CBD is focused on labour racketeering 
and forcing businesses to use their 
labour in the form of bouncers and 
security consultants. Furthermore, there 
is a level of extortion by these security 
companies due to the increased charges 
they force on business owners in the 
CBD. reports suggest that about 200 
venues were paying SpS anything 
between r250 a week and r25 000 a 
month in protection fees for bouncers, 
while smaller venues were forced into 
taking on additional security at an 
inflated price.80 Despite the closing of 
SpS, many of the same individuals are 
still believed to be involved in protection 
rackets in the CBD. The continued 
power of these individuals, despite 
occasional disruptions, is based on the 
monopolistic rackets that occurred in 
the early 1990s. The violence of those 
years has continued to the current date, 
but the level of that violence is now 
comparatively limited.
Thus the CBD has seen the 
entrenchment of criminal networks 
established at a time of weakened state 
authority. These protection rackets 
have almost become an accepted 
part of the Cape nightlife, similar to the 
entrenchment of pizzo taxes in Italy. 
Businesses are willing to deal with the 
number of gang bosses and criminal 
businessmen have shares in or own 
clubs and bars in the CBD, often through 
proxies.
Furthermore, it is evident that tolerance 
for these protection rackets is based 
on the belief that they often provide a 
service. The relationship between these 
groups and those in business is difficult 
to fully ascertain. While there is a distinct 
element of resentment over payments, 
there is also the perception of protection 
While there is a distinct element of resentment over 
payments, there is also the perception of protection 
rackets being a ‘necessary evil’ given the nightlife and 
the number of threats on the street
payments in order to avoid the flare-
ups in violence witnessed in the 1990s. 
Even with the improvement in the 
state’s imposition of its authority, it is 
difficult to remove the criminal element. 
The network itself is highly organised 
and sophisticated, and is capable of 
adapting to changing conditions. The 
modus operandi of these criminals 
means that payments have been made 
to networked criminal enterprises for 
decades. The criminals involved in the 
trade have remained fairly constant 
despite the recent arrests of some 
members, and those involved seem to 
have a focused connection to the area. 
This gives credence to the theory that 
protection crime in the CBD is primarily 
networked and monopolised, despite 
occasional outbreaks of violence. These 
outbreaks seem to occur after a central 
figure in the network is killed or arrested, 
although payments are still made. In 
the SpS case, the large number of 
arrests that were made as a result of the 
media hype around SpS’s activities was 
followed by the release of the majority 
of those arrested. Therefore there was 
continuity in the protection racket. Gang 
bosses’ presence also extends beyond 
the provision of protection services. A 
rackets being a ‘necessary evil’ given 
the nightlife and the number of threats 
on the street, including drug dealing and 
theft. police cannot be everywhere all the 
time and protection rackets’ potentiality 
of violence – much more so than that of 
‘ordinary’ security companies – makes 
them suitable and necessary candidates. 
Thus despite the increases in the state’s 
capacity and authority in the CBD, the 
provision of security in South Africa often 
has to be shared by a variety of actors, 
including private security companies.
Drug dealing in the CBD remains big 
business, and the nature of many nightlife 
businesses creates two scenarios. 
Firstly, there is substantial profit to be 
made through drug dealing in a club and 
therefore there is a need for organised 
criminals to control that element. The 
drug trade falls in the realm of anti-
sovereignty for the state and these illegal 
markets thus need criminal structures to 
provide this type of criminal governance. 
Secondly, in order to control and limit 
criminality, protection rackets become 
a necessary evil. According to leggett, 
the security trade is important for the 
drug trade as those who control the 
security at the club control the club, 
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and thus the drugs moving in and out 
of the establishment.81 This is reiterated 
by kinnes, who argues that the rackets 
not only provide bouncers with designer 
drugs but that these bouncers in 
turn also distribute drugs. Similarly, in 
johannesburg the Elite security group 
had links with criminal groups such as 
the Hells Angels and, according to the 
Mail and Guardian, ‘whoever controls 
the door controls the drugs’.82 However, 
while these links are often made, it 
should also be noted that the nature of 
the market has changed and often more 
sophisticated buyers will get their drugs 
entrepreneurs (including in bouncing and 
‘protection’) had devoted part of their 
early life to violent sports such as boxing 
and kickboxing. It was these skills that 
made them ideal candidates to begin 
enforcing protection services.85
In Cape Town, a large number of those 
involved in the protection racket also 
appear to have a background in violent 
sports. For example, yuri ‘the russian’ 
and Houssain Ait Taleb (the leader of 
the moroccans) were both well-known 
kickboxing champions, and Cyril Beeka 
had a black belt in karate. Volkov argues 
that it was in many of these sporting 
Corruption in the police force and among 
other political figures is a major issue and 
is highlighted by Beeka’s association with 
such high-ranking individuals. However, 
while Beeka’s notoriety placed him in 
the spotlight, other organised criminals 
also have significant influence over the 
police. For example, Dan plato, the 
Western Cape mEC for Community 
Safety, related a story of how a decision 
to raid nightclubs was made at a 
mAnCom meeting at 9am. By 9.30am, 
plato received calls from his sources 
notifying him that the information had 
been leaked.88
Thus protection racketeering, in particular 
labour racketeering, in the CBD is 
systemic, sophisticated and entrenched, 
especially within the nightlife industry. 
Failure by regulatory bodies to ensure 
compliance with legislative mandates 
blurs the distinctions between legal and 
illegal private security companies, and 
rampant corruption at a high level makes 
it difficult to remove these entrenched 
networks of criminality. The violent 
reputations of these criminals have also 
made it difficult for business owners 
to turn to the authorities, despite the 
gains made by the city in increasing 
state capacity.
On the Cape Flats
residents of the Cape Flats tend to 
rely on informal means of security 
and protection as the state battles to 
establish its authority. A weak state may 
lack the political legitimacy required for 
society to accept its right to enforce the 
rules it imposes, which organised crime 
groups or organised criminals may have. 
Thus the growth of protection rackets 
can be symptomatic of a ‘disconnect’ 
between state and society, with the state 
being unwilling or unable to provide 
protection and/or enforce its authority 
on errant members of the community.89 
Additionally, if a state has a limited 
capacity to deal with corruption, society 
will be less likely to turn to legitimate 
Corruption remains a major problem in both the 
SAPS and municipal policing. The failure to eradicate 
corruption and the decline in trust in the police allow 
non-state actors to gain legitimacy
before going to a club, as they are more 
assured of levels of quality and have 
fewer problems with law enforcement.
many of these protection rackets thrive 
due to the threat of force. protection 
rackets are managed by dangerous 
people. The names associated with 
protection rackets are also often at the 
upper echelons of crime in Cape Town. 
An increased payment is less trouble 
than the threat posed by protection 
rackets. Volkov describes these 
individuals as violent entrepreneurs.83 
A sociological study of the bouncer 
trade in England asked why men would 
choose a profession in bouncing, given 
the dangerous environment, levels of 
organised crime and relatively poor 
pay. What the study found was that 
‘the real benefits of the occupation 
are grounded deep within masculine 
working-class culture and self identity 
with its powerful appreciation of bodily 
power, personal and group respect and 
violent engagement’.84 yet, this is not the 
only explanation for choosing a violent 
career. In russia, a number of violent 
clubs that this warrior community began 
organising into criminal groups. In russia, 
the community of violent entrepreneurs 
developed and bonded in these sports’ 
clubhouses. According to media reports, 
Ait Taleb’s kickboxing club in Cape Town 
was primarily used by members of the 
now defunct SpS. This environment 
and resultant criminality ties in with 
Sutherland’s differential association 
theory.86 Similarly, the protection 
business also provided a number of 
former soldiers or police officers with a 
supplemental or new source of income. 
many of the bouncers in leggett’s 
study of drugs and organised crime in 
South Africa were known to be former 
police or army members.87 Similarly, the 
links established by former police and 
security officers with criminals and their 
knowledge of operations made the slip 
into criminality far easier.
Corruption remains a major problem in 
both the SApS and municipal policing. 
The failure to eradicate corruption and 
the decline in trust in the police allow 
non-state actors to gain legitimacy. 
13ISS PAPER 259  •  AUGUST 2014
sources of authority and instead resort 
to the services of organised criminals 
and protection racketeers. on the Cape 
Flats, the lack of state authority and the 
importance of criminal gangs create 
additional complications for protection 
rackets. Gangs are arguably as important 
as the state in providing protection, albeit 
informal, in these areas and have gained 
a significant level of legitimacy, as have 
private protection companies in many 
former non-white areas.
While the CBD has a more noticeable 
group of protection racketeers with 
a particular modus operandi, the 
Cape Flats has more diverse types 
of protection rackets. These rackets 
may be systemic or opportunistic and 
can range from a required or desired 
presence to coercive extortion. Due 
to the rampant crime problem on the 
Cape Flats, a variety of actors extract 
extortion. As a purely extractive coercion, 
street gangs can demand payment from 
business owners in an unsophisticated 
manner. Standing’s study showed that 
formal businesses were often capable 
of limiting this threat.90 However, there 
are exceptions and extortion can still 
occur. Furthermore, this form of extortion 
can become more formalised as the 
group establishes its territory in the area. 
What is noticeable is that those who 
cannot turn to authorities are the most 
at risk. From the first section it is evident 
that those in informal businesses are 
more likely to suffer from extortion than 
those with a formal business, and that 
foreigners and vulnerable populations 
seem highly likely to fall victim to some 
kind of extortion, both opportunistic 
and systemic.91 Additionally, it has been 
shown that the state’s failure to establish 
its authority make protection rackets an 
important source of informal protection 
and vulnerable businessmen can actively 
seek these forms of protection.92
Similarly, businesses in vulnerable 
positions (often illegal and illicit) are also 
at the mercy of extortion rackets, but 
these relationships tend to be more 
symbiotic. Shebeens, businesses 
operating illegally and drug dealers all 
benefit from having a relationship with 
protection rackets. Thus the protection 
racket moves from one of extortion 
to one with similarities to the krysha 
system. many shebeens are unable to 
enter the legitimate business sector and 
therefore depend on alternative forms of 
protection, extortive or not.
Similarly, those in the taxi business, 
which has been ravaged by violence, 
are also known to pay protection fees 
to bodies that blur the line between 
the criminal and the legitimate. These 
fees are arguably necessary, given the 
violence and the inability of the state to 
regulate and govern the taxi industry. 
Furthermore, gangs often practise 
coercive extortion on taxis. What is 
noticeable in the taxi industry is that 
there is a nexus between gangs, mother 
bodies and taxi businesses.
Importantly, legitimate forms of authority 
such as the police also run protection 
rackets against vulnerable businesses 
such as shebeens and can actively 
seek protection money. The corruption 
of the Cape Flats police force is far 
more serious than that of the CBD, 
with police providing protection to as 
well as potentially becoming part of the 
drug business. Grobler’s study found 
that aspects of police culture (such as 
the code of silence) made it harder to 
limit this corruption. Furthermore, as 
criminality is entrenched and political 
patronage becomes the norm, there is a 
possibility that those seeking protection 
may turn to members of the community, 
including officials, without going through 
the correct channels.
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